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Abstract
This article discusses how the principles, values, and actionable policy areas detailed in the
UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI can help steer the impact of artificial
intelligence (AI) on jobs, skills, and the future of work in an inclusive, accountable, transparent,
and people-centered way, and in line with the rule of law. It also discusses the provisions
contained in this normative instrument compared with existing evidence on the cognitive and
socioemotional skills required in the digital era, and the way AI is shaping job tasks,
employment dynamics, and occupational mobility-related needs. It examines the challenges
and possibilities related to fostering inclusiveness in the AI era, with a special focus on how to
fix gender-related gaps and address discrimination.

Gabriela Ramos is the Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences of UNESCO. Previously, she
was OECD Chief of Staff and Sherpa to the G20/G7.
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Living, learning, and working

in the age of artificial intelligence (AI) will likely be very
different from anything humanity has ever experienced. AI consists of “systems which have
the capacity to process data and information in a way that resembles intelligent behaviour, and
typically includes aspects of reasoning, learning, perception, prediction, planning or control.”1
It is expected that AI, if largely deployed and adopted, will lead to the much-sought
productivity growth that the IT revolution was expected to produce, possibly putting to rest the
long-lasting heated discussion about the Solow’s paradox.2 Recent evidence, while still scarce,
does show that adopting AI leads, under some conditions, to increases in productivity,3 and
that AI adoption relates positively with Tobin’s Q,4 especially when AI is meant to augment
the capability of a firm rather than automating processes or tasks. Self-learning algorithms and
smart machines are playing an increasingly important role in our efforts to address the COVID19 pandemic and recover from the crisis. 5
While helping to keep our economies, schools, and societies going during the crisis and
enhancing production processes and output, AI development and deployment has also brought
under the spotlight the need for a profound ethical reflection on the impact of AI and societies’
ability to address current and future challenges.6 The World Commission on the Ethics of
Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), serving under the Social and Human
Sciences Sector of UNESCO, defined these challenges in a seminal 2019 report that led to the
elaboration of a global standard on the ethics of AI in the form of a recommendation.7 The
study considered the downsides of AI technologies, particularly the risk of advancing business
models that contribute to an increase in the already high levels of inequality existing within
and between countries and to a further narrowing of (also cultural) diversity.
The UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI (henceforth UNESCO AI
Recommendation) was adopted in its final form, by standing ovation, at the 41st General
Conference of UNESCO. It establishes a comprehensive framework, based on principles and
values, including the full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, environmental
sustainability, and gender equality, and on inclusive and fair outcomes. The UNESCO AI
Recommendation calls for AI that is accountable and transparent and in line with the rule of
law. It further calls for concrete actions in a wide array of relevant policy fields, including
education, culture, communication, gender, data governance, and the labor market. The part
that focuses on labor acknowledges the changing world of work and looks into issues such as
workforce adaptability and skill upscaling, while also calling for economic and fiscal policies
that will help new applications and business models based on AI flourish and contribute to
economic performance but also to societal empowerment and inclusion.
The development, adoption, and deployment of AI is profoundly changing the (type of)
tasks that workers need to perform on the job and the competences required to do so.8 AI is
also contributing to the emergence of new occupational profiles and work modalities, which
may or may not be high skill or high quality, in terms of pay, tenure, training opportunities,
and working hours.9 “Gig” jobs, entailing the remote provision of digital services through
online labor platforms, while often offering flexibility and autonomy, may result in low pay
and irregular working hours and overwork and may lead to social isolation and exhaustion. 10
Because of the pervasiveness and widespread impact of these technologies, the UNESCO AI
Recommendation calls for endowing individuals with a “wider range of core and
interdisciplinary skills” and fostering the skill of “learning how to learn” over people’s lifetime.
AI is also changing the way we learn, how we acquire, select, and process information,
and how we relate to each other. At times, AI helps us access information or make decisions
that it would have been impossible in the past, while at other times it causes segmentation and
creates disinformation and misinformation, constraining our ability to properly assess
situations and problems and make informed decisions.11 As the possibilities that AI offers
multiply, so too do concerns that AI will amplify existing divides and inequalities, create new
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ones, and be used to erode human rights and challenge fundamental freedoms and even
democracy.12
The wealth of technological developments that AI encompasses and the breadth and depth
of changes that this general-purpose technology triggers make it a game changer for societies
and economies. But games need clear rules so players can participate and outcomes can be fair.
In the digital space, however, winners take all (or most) dynamics, that is, a few companies
take most of the market, thanks to scale economies and the network effects that often emerge.13
The same is true for AI-related innovations. Evidence shows that about three-quarters of patent
families related to AI belong to the top two thousand companies investing the most in research
and development in the world. 14 Widening divides emerge in terms of firm innovativeness,
performance, market share, and bargaining power, as well as who benefits from the value
created by AI and the extent to which AI-leveraged systems such as platforms may erode social
surplus.15
The structural transformations that AI entails call for policies that are inclusive by design
and that rely on clear ethical principles that can be translated into implementable and effective
policy actions. Such human-centered ethical values and principles are at the core of the
UNESCO AI Recommendation. In this article, I discuss how this normative instrument and its
implementation can help policy steer the impact of AI on jobs, skills, and the future of work,
allowing individuals and institutions to leverage on the opportunities offered by AI while
addressing the challenges that this new technological paradigm poses.
The UNESCO AI Recommendation, in addition to boasting provisions of unprecedented
breadth and depth and universal coverage, is unique in its deployment ambition and
possibilities. To ensure the effective implementation of the UNESCO AI Recommendation,
when member states adopted it, they committed to helping UNESCO develop specific tools for
deployment to materialize and consolidate. These tools are the readiness assessment (RA)
methodology, designed to assist member states at different development stages, and the ethical
impact assessment (EIA) methodology of AI technologies. The UNESCO AI Recommendation
further attests to the importance of multilateralism in the era of technologies that know no
boundaries or application limits in their possibilities. These technologies can do a lot of good
but they can also cause harm and, if not developed, adopted, and deployed following clear
ethical principles, may exacerbate inequalities, create new divides, and jeopardize any hope of
having inclusive and sustainable societies and economies.
The UNESCO AI Recommendation is a powerful tool that can level the playing field for
individuals and economic agents around the world. UNESCO member states committed to
recurrently report on implementation progresses (every four years) and to build and enforce
redressal mechanisms. These mechanisms are intended to ensure that human rights,
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law are respected in the digital world and in the physical
world. This article highlights what the UNESCO AI Recommendation says about policies that
address jobs, skills, and the future of work and seeks to make them more inclusive by design.
I agree with Rodrik and Stantcheva that we need a new approach to regulation that is more
collaborative and iterative and that is coupled with new institutional arrangements enabling
synergies and strategic cooperation between different stakeholders, including governments,
firms, and the civil society.16

Skills, Ethical Awareness, and the Role of Education
AI and digitalization change the type and distribution of job tasks that workers are asked to
perform and the skills required for the purpose. 17 Ensuring that nobody is left behind requires
endowing individuals with the “right” skills for today’s and tomorrow’s increasingly digital
and globalized world and making them aware of the possible ethical challenges that the use
3
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and abuse of general purpose and pervasive technologies like AI may entail. This is key to
ensuring that we have inclusive labor markets that are also conducive to innovation, growth.
and well-being.
Recent discussions about policy and policy interventions have at times put too much
emphasis on the importance of digital skills alone and the need for people to acquire these
skills, as if other skills no longer matter or matter to a much lesser extent. 18 While having a
sufficient ability to navigate the Internet, acquire and share relevant information, and
appropriately use and manage information and communication tools (ICT) have become a must
in the digital era, we have plenty of evidence that digital skills alone do not go very far. Analysis
shows that, to navigate and thrive in the AI and digital era, individuals need to be endowed
with a wide array of cognitive and noncognitive skills and must be able to learn and update
their knowledge throughout their life.
Evidence from online job openings in several countries shows that, in addition to a set of
generic skills, AI-related workers need communication, problem-solving, creativity, and
teamwork-related skills.19 Skills related to team work appear to have gained importance
recently and now complement AI-specific competencies as well as software-related skills—
which amount to about one-third of the skills required in AI jobs—though to different extents
in different countries.20 Overall, the analysis shows that, regardless of whether their job entails
developing or adopting AI, AI workers are technically skilled people who need a set of AI
skills related to machine learning, data mining, cluster analysis, natural language processing,
and robotics.
Two interesting features further emerge that are relevant for policy, especially education
and training policies. One is that, while AI technologies are rapidly evolving, the skills required
for AI-related workers appear to have been relatively stable during the decade 2010–2020,
suggesting that it is possible and desirable to identify and invest in the acquisition of sets of
skills that will likely be needed also for the AI talent of the future. 21 Moreover, a significant
number of socioemotional skills appear to be constantly demanded in combination with more
cognitive skills. These include communication, teamwork, and problem-solving skills, which
appear together with creativity and writing. Communication-related skills appear to be
especially key in the United States as compared to the other countries in the analysis, possibly
reflecting the need to communicate among and with the team developing or adopting AI. 22
Existing evidence points to the need to endow individuals with both technical skills and more
socioemotional and “soft” skills if they are to work with AI and be able to benefit from the
opportunities offered by the digital technologies’ paradigm. The need for both kinds of skills
is becoming even more important in the light of the accelerated adoption and deployment of
AI technologies triggered by COVID and the consequent increase in the demand for data
scientists and AI experts in both advanced and developing countries.23
Along the same lines, drawing on a systematic literature review of more than fifteen
hundred articles, Van Laar and colleagues argue that twenty-first-century skills are broader
than digital skills alone and that they are not necessarily being underpinned by ICT.24 The
authors identify seven core skills: technical, information management, communication,
collaboration, creativity, critical thinking, and problem solving. They also identify five
“contextual skills”: ethical awareness, cultural awareness, flexibility, self-direction, and
lifelong learning.
The need to couple cognitive and socioemotional skills with ethical awareness, for people
to be protagonists and take center stage in the AI era, is well captured in paragraph 44 of the
UNESCO AI Recommendation, “Awareness and Literacy.” It states:
Public awareness and understanding of AI technologies and the value of data should be
promoted through open and accessible education, civic engagement, digital skills and
AI ethics training, media and information literacy and training led jointly by
4
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governments, intergovernmental organizations, civil society, academia, the media,
community leaders and the private sector, and considering the existing linguistic, social
and cultural diversity, to ensure effective public participation so that all members of
society can take informed decisions about their use of AI systems and be protected from
undue influence.
Moreover, Policy Area 8, “Education and Research,” calls on UNESCO’s 193 member
states to
promote the acquisition of “prerequisite skills” for AI education, such as basic literacy,
numeracy, coding and digital skills, and media and information literacy, as well as
critical and creative thinking, teamwork, communication, socio-emotional and AI
ethics skills, especially in countries and in regions or areas within countries where there
are notable gaps in the education of these skills.
The importance of having a human rights–based inclusive approach to the development
and adoption of game-changing technologies like AI is reiterated in paragraph 106 of the
UNESCO AI Recommendation. This paragraph underlines the need to develop AI ethics
curricula at all levels and in different in languages, including, for example, indigenous
languages. The recommendation further stresses the need to make education and skills policies
inclusive by design by asking that these policies take into account the diversity of
environments, and the needs of persons with disabilities. These provisions are empowering for
individuals and economic agents alike because they foster inclusion and enhance outcomes and
performance, in keeping with the evidence that has long shown diversity to be a key element
in fostering innovativeness and enhancing performance.25

Jobs, Employment, and Occupational Mobility in the Era of Artificial
Intelligence
Studies of occupational groups for which AI-related jobs are advertised, as might be expected,
reveal that many AI jobs are posted in the 2008 International Standard Classification of
Occupations (ISCO08) categories of “Professionals” and “Technicians and Associated
Professionals.” In terms of sectors of activity, studies found demand for AI-related workers in
almost all sectors of the economy, though to different degrees. The sectors “Information and
Communication” and “Financial and Insurance Activities” post the highest number of such
online job openings, followed by “Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities.” Between
2012 and 2018, though, demand for AI-related workers emerges throughout all the sectors of
the economy, in all countries that the authors consider in the study. 26 Overall, existing evidence
highlights the pervasiveness of AI, which translates in a growing number of online postings of
AI-related job openings (both in absolute and in relative terms, i.e., in relation to the overall
number of jobs posted), in relation to all ISCO08 occupational groups, and throughout all
sectors of the economy. This means that AI is not only something that professionals, managers,
and technicians are asked to deal with but that is entering the life of, for example, sales workers
as well as plant machine operators.
Figure 1 shows the progression in the number of AI-related jobs posted online in the United
States for the period 2012–2018, for a select group of occupations. These are the occupations
normally supposed to be medium or low skill and are the ones for which, in general, one would
not expect AI skills to be a “typical” component of the skill set demanded in these types of
jobs. As can be seen, though, the number of overall staff involved is relatively small and
demand for AI-related workers in these occupations has been constantly growing and at a
relatively faster pace in the later years considered in the analysis.
5
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Figure 1. Number of AI-related jobs posted in the United States, by ISCO08 occupation,
selected occupations (Source: Author’s own compilation based on Mariagrazia Squicciarini
and Heike Nachtigall, “Demand for AI Skills in Jobs: Evidence from Online Job Postings,”
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, no. 2021/03, 2021,
doi.org/10.1787/3ed32d94-en, table 6.3)
This fact, which likely mirrors greater or wider development and adoption of AI by firms,
raises important questions for policy in terms of how to ensure that workers, especially lowskill workers, are endowed with the skills needed to work with AI. And, relatedly, if AI
development and adoption picks up, as one would hope for performance reasons, questions
remain about how to foster suitable matches in the labor market and how to ensure that those
whose skills do not match can nevertheless find, stay with, or move to good jobs. Often the
answer is education and training, and that upskill and reskill can go a long way. 27
Upskilling and reskilling, however, take time and money, and, in two ways, those who
need it the most may not benefit from it. First, evidence shows that workers who most need
training are those less likely to receive it. Training, especially when sponsored by firms, is
often used as a reward mechanism for the best performing and most skilled workers, because
it pays off in terms of returns on investment. 28 Second, low-skill individuals are at times those
who found it harder than their peers to engage in education or progress in the education system
or who simply did not go to school and learn.29 This is why the UNESCO AI Recommendation
calls for governments to work with stakeholders to fill the gap of skill-set requirements. It also
calls for including workers and unions in the discussions to ensure a fair transition for at-risk
employees by, for example, “putting in place upskilling and reskilling programmes, finding
effective mechanisms of retaining employees during those transition periods, and exploring
‘safety net’ programmes for those who cannot be retrained” (paragraph 118).
These workers are the ones who, because of the hollowing out of the labor market, are
already suffering from comparatively low salaries and from relatively “low-quality” jobs
conditions related, for example, to tenure or training.30 On one hand, AI brings promises of
enhanced performance and, consequently, relatively better salaries, because better-performing
firms are normally those that pay workers better.31 On the other hand, workers’ conditions may
likely improve for workers who are able to stay and learn and for new workers hired for the
purpose. But for those unwilling or unable to learn or for whom learning is impossible because
they are too old or because they lack the relevant training opportunities, the introduction and
use of AI may translate into dismissal and failure to find a different job. In general, the
6
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introduction of AI can lead to greater inequality between those working with AI and those who
do not or cannot do so.
Analyses of the tasks that workers perform on the job and on workers’ skills endowment
and learning possibilities show that the cost of moving to a different job (either within the same
firm or elsewhere) is not trivial. Andrieu and colleagues estimate that, at the country level, the
minimum cost of moving workers in occupations at high risk of automation to occupations in
which they are not at such risk (which the authors call “safe haven”) ranges between 1 percent
and 5 percent of one year of GDP in the countries considered.32 This amount, while not
negligible, would not need to be disbursed in one only year, since the duration of the training
envisaged may last several years. Still, it remains high and it may prove hard for countries and
firms alike to sustain such costs and have the right incentives to do so. Moreover, if one
considers that the overall cost of the estimated job-to-job transition depends on the occupation
that workers may need to move to, and on how distant they are from the occupation of origin
in terms of skills to be acquired, it becomes natural to fear for those that are already left behind.
At the individual-worker level, the authors find that such costs increase in keeping with the
level of cognitive skills of the workers in the occupation of origin, that is, the lower the level
of initial skill endowment, the greater the training needed; the proportion of workers at high
risk of automation in the manufacturing sector; and the average age of workers in the
occupation.33
On one hand, these findings represent good news, in the sense that they dissipate the huge
concerns trigged by Frey and Osborne and their argument that 47 percent of workers may be
at risk of losing their jobs because of automation.34 (This figure is 14 percent, according to
Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn).35 Good news also comes from the fact that the analysis of
Andrieu and colleagues based on skills (both skill endowment and skills required in the
occupation of destination) shows that all workers, if duly trained, can move to a different
occupation and to performing different tasks.36 So even if AI-related jobs sometimes require
that workers learn a new set of skills in order to accomplish the tasks that working with AI
entails, unemployment is not inevitable. Conversely, in the absence of sufficient (also financial)
support and of the “right” incentives (e.g., policies supporting employees’ retention), the new
technological paradigm that AI represents may further contribute to marginalizing workers who
are already on the wrong side of the distribution in terms of income, skills, or tenure. This
further marginalization would jeopardize their inclusion in the world of work and, more
generally, in society.
Policy Area 10 of the UNESCO AI Recommendation, “Economy and Labour,” addresses
these concerns and calls member states to “assess and address the impact of AI systems on
labour markets and its implications for education requirements, in all countries and with special
emphasis on countries where the economy is labour-intensive” (paragraph 116). In the same
area, paragraph 118 calls for coordinated multistakeholder action, including government,
companies, the civil society, and workers and unions, to put in place “upskilling and reskilling
programmes, finding effective mechanisms of retaining employees during those transition
periods, and exploring ‘safety net’ programmes for those who cannot be retrained.” It further
calls for evidence-based policy making, by asking member states to
develop and implement programmes to research and address the challenges identified
that could include upskilling and reskilling, enhanced social protection, proactive
industry policies and interventions, tax benefits, new taxation forms, among others.
Member States should ensure that there is sufficient public funding to support these
programmes. Relevant regulations, such as tax regimes, should be carefully examined
and changed if needed to counteract the consequences of unemployment caused by AIbased automation.
7

New England Journal of Public Policy
These provisions become all the more important in consideration of the fact that demand
for AI-related jobs appears very concentrated geographically. Thus, the effect of AI
deployment may be more intense in some places than in others, creating inequalities at the local
level as well. Although the number of AI-related vacancies has increased in all parts of the
United States, also as a share of total vacancies, a majority of those jobs continues to be located
in California.37 Also, more than one in ten (about 14 percent) AI-related jobs are advertised in
manufacturing in the United States, which appears to be the second most AI-intensive sector
(following business services). Compared with business services, manufacturing AI jobs put
more emphasis on competencies related to robotics and computer/software engineering,
suggesting that automation may progressively be taking place, though not necessarily to replace
workers.38
Moreover, if one takes into account the fact that people may (have to) change jobs several
times during their working life, the need for recurrent training and upskilling and reskilling
becomes imperative. Data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, for example, show that the
median years of tenure with the current employer varies substantially across occupations,
ranging between less than three years for service occupations to more than six years for
managers.39 Turnover on the labor market contributed to the inclusion in the UNESCO AI
Recommendation a general call for recurring action and support.

Being Inclusive in the Era of Artificial Intelligence: Key Challenges and
Possibilities
In addition to widening or narrowing down the possibilities of a worker’s finding a job or
remaining in a certain job or occupation and, relatedly, the need to exhibit or acquire a certain
(set of) skills for this to happen, AI algorithms can be a source of disinformation,
misinformation, and discrimination. The challenges related to this use of AI algorithms are so
great that some are starting to question whether they might presage the end of democracy,40
while others are leveraging machine learning to detect misinformation and disinformation in
an effort to exploit the opportunities offered by AI to address the shortcomings that AI itself
triggers.41
On the subject of the labor market and jobs, gender-based and racial discrimination is a
big concern. Two famous (or rather, infamous) examples are Amazon’s AI recruiting tool that
showed bias against women 42 and Google’s firing of Timnit Gebru after she posted, “Your life
starts getting worse when you start advocating for underrepresented people.”43 Also, one study
found that women account for only 12 percent of machine-learning researchers. 44
Stanford University’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) shows
that women accounted for less than 19 percent, on average, of all AI and computer science PhD
graduates in North America over the past ten years and that, in 2019, 45 percent of new USresident AI PhD graduates were white, compared with 2.4 percent African American and 3.2
percent Hispanic.45 Looking at some of the figures contained in the Alan Touring Institute’s
report “Where Are the Women?,” one sees that only 10–15 percent of machine-learning
researchers are women in leading technology companies and that, on average, only 12 percent
of authors who had contributed work to the leading three machine-learning conferences in 2017
were women.46 As Young and colleagues explain, the fact that women and marginalized groups
are underrepresented in data science and AI, compounded by algorithmic and data biases, is a
source of concern today and for the future.47 At present, the lack of diversity challenges
fundamental ethical issues of social and economic justice and jeopardizes the value that
diversity may bring. In addition, as AI becomes ubiquitous, the lack of diversity becomes
engrained and to the extent that gender bias gets built into AI systems and AI-related products,
thus making our future even more unequal.
8
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The UNESCO AI Recommendation has an entire policy area dedicated to gender, Policy
Area 6. This area begins by requiring member states to ensure that digital technologies and AI
contribute to the achievement of gender equality. It goes on to underline the need for
governments to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms and especially the safety
and integrity of girls and women are not violated at any stage of the AI system life cycle
(paragraph 87).
Once having set these general principles, the UNESCO AI Recommendation goes much
deeper asks members states, in effect, to “walk the talk” by putting in place positive actions
aimed at ensuring the full inclusion of girls and women in AI, in all spheres of life, including
education and employment. Paragraph 88 states:
Member States should have dedicated funds from their public budgets linked to
financing gender-responsive schemes, ensure that national digital policies include a
gender action plan, and develop relevant policies, for example, on labour education,
targeted at supporting girls and women to make sure they are not left out of the digital
economy powered by AI. Special investment in providing targeted programmes and
gender-specific language, to increase the opportunities of girls’ and women’s
participation in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), including
information and communication technologies (ICT) disciplines, preparedness,
employability, equal career development and professional growth of girls and women,
should be considered and implemented.
The recommendation further stresses the need for member states to ensure that AI does
not exacerbate already existing (and often wide) gender gaps. It also mandates that they put in
place policies to reduce the gender wage gap and the unequal representation in certain
professions and activities; to address the lack of representation, especially at top management
positions, boards of directors, or research teams in the AI field; and to reduce the education
gap, the gap in digital and AI access, adoption, usage, and affordability, and the unequal
distribution of unpaid work and caring responsibilities (Paragraph 89). As can be seen, the
prescriptions contained in the UNESCO AI Recommendation aim not only to ensure that AI
technologies do not create new divides but that they actually leverage the opportunities offered
by AI and the prescriptions contained in the document to help remove divides and gaps that
already exist also in the analogue world.
Another societally enhancing prescription in the UNESCO AI Recommendation addresses
gender stereotyping and discriminatory biases, with the aim of preventing these from being
translated into AI systems. The recommendation further posits that member states need to
identify and proactively redress any problems caused by AI technologies and systems. For
gender-related problems caused by AI, the recommendation asks member states to avoid the
compounding negative effect of technological divides in achieving gender equality and
avoiding violence such as harassment, bullying, or trafficking of girls and women and other
underrepresented groups, including in the online domain. It further calls for policies that ensure
harassment-free environments and concrete actions aimed to promote diversity throughout the
AI system life cycle.
Finally, paragraph 91 of the UNESCO AI Recommendation states the need for member
states to
encourage female entrepreneurship, participation and engagement in all stages of an AI
system life cycle by offering and promoting economic, regulatory incentives, among
other incentives and support schemes, as well as policies that aim at a balanced gender
participation in AI research in academia, gender representation on digital and AI
companies’ top management positions, boards of directors and research teams. Member
States should ensure that public funds (for innovation, research and technologies) are
9
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channelled to inclusive programmes and companies, with clear gender representation,
and that private funds are similarly encouraged through affirmative action principles.
One of the key principles stated by the UNESCO AI Recommendation is human oversight
and determination, whereby member states need to ensure that it is always possible to attribute
ethical and legal responsibilities and remedies at any stage of the life cycle of AI systems.
Human oversight refers not only to individual human oversight but to inclusive public
oversight, as appropriate. This and the principles of “Fairness and non-discrimination” stated
in the document together become key pillars of gender inclusion, and, more broadly, help
ensure nondiscrimination toward any human being “regardless of race, colour, descent, gender,
age, language, religion, political opinion, national origin, ethnic origin, social origin, economic
or social condition of birth, or disability and any other grounds, in terms of access to and
participation in the AI system life cycle” (paragraph 28).

Conclusions
The UNESCO AI Recommendation sets the basis for all relevant stakeholders to take action
and ensure that the opportunities offered by AI are leveraged and that challenges are addressed,
with the aim to help build more inclusive and cohesive societies and economies, including the
world of work. The call for such an instrument stems from a realization that regulations often
lag behind the market developments—as with AI technologies—and that regulations that are
not apt for the digital age may lead to unfair, unethical, and eventually detrimental practices
and outcomes.
Ethical issues arise with respect to AI systems throughout their whole life cycle and with
respect to the way markets are structured and function and how they are regulated in the digital
sphere. Thus, the ethics of AI must involve the laying out of norms and principles for AI
development, adoption, and deployment that ensure the rule of law online.
Because the value-neutrality thesis, claiming that technology is morally and politically
neutral (or otherwise neither good nor bad), has by now been widely rejected,48 it is nearly
impossible to claim value neutrality in the case of AI. People are making choices throughout
AI systems, ranging from research, design, and development to deployment and use. Their
personal ideas and those of their group constitute what is being passed down through the AI
ecosystem. AI is not self-sufficient and relies on human-made classifications, decisions, and
“mundane” tasks in order to function properly. For example, even in the development stage,
teams who develop algorithms can translate their own values into an AI system, as shown by
Conway’s law, which provides that in the absence of clear rules and instructions, the choices
that teams make tend to reflect the implicit values of the group.49 If to this tendency we add
that AI methods rely on large amounts of data and that these data are never fully representative
or may even come prepacked with value categories, it is easy to see how this may result in wide
range of biases, harm, and discrimination.
We need to upgrade rules and regulations, laws and institutions to ensure that they can
deal with AI, including by introducing relevant regulations, such as tax regimes, that aim to
counteract the possible unemployment caused by AI-based automation. We also need to step
up and ensure competitive markets and consumer protection and prevent the abuse of dominant
market positions, including by monopolies. And we need to pay special attention to developing
countries, because they are more exposed and vulnerable to changing labor landscapes and the
abuses of market dominance.
And we must do so by putting people and their needs back at the center and endowing
them with the skills to navigate and thrive in the AI era. Skills such as “learning how to learn,”
communication, critical thinking, teamwork, empathy, and the ability to transfer one’s
knowledge across domains should be taught alongside specialist and technical skills. And,
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above all, we need to endow all individuals with ethical awareness so that they may question
and make choices informed by key human-rights value, in the digital and in the analogue world.
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